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Article
Unemployment in early
career in the UK: A trap
or a stepping stone?
Paul Schmelzer
Research Institute of the Federal Employment Agency, Nu¨rnberg, Germany
Abstract
In this article, I analyse the consequences of unemployment on the re-entry occupational status
and subsequent occupational status growth of different educational groups in the first years of
employment in the UK. I argue that phases of unemployment mean different things for different
educational groups. The sequential nature of job offers causes job searchers either to accept a
job offer immediately or to wait for the next offer. Higher aspirations and higher levels of
savings mean that high-educated people are more likely to wait until they are offered a job that
improves their occupational position. In the case of low-educatedworkers, however, waiting for
a better job offer might not be the best strategy, because they might never get one; in addition,
the low level of unemployment benefits from previous salaries, the regime of sanctions linked to
the right to receive unemployment benefits and low household incomes push them into employ-
ment. I use growth curve models and parameterize in one model both the pre-unemployment
and the post-unemployment phases. Based on British Household Panel Survey (BHPS) data, the
results confirm my argumentation: high-educated people gain status while low-educated
entrants lose status upon re-entering the labour market after unemployment.
Keywords
education, event history analysis, growth curve models, pull vs. push mechanism, scar effect of
unemployment
Introduction
Unemployment is usually associated with a negative effect on one’s post-unemployment career:
unemployment increases the individual’s future risk of again being unemployed and might leave a
long-lasting scar on that person’s wages (Arulampalam, 2001; Gangl, 2006). However, an unemploy-
ment phase might also have a positive impact on post-displacement wages. Indeed, there is some
evidence of this from studies, mainly for Anglo-Saxon countries at the beginning of the employment
career for wages (Kahn and Low, 1982; Antel, 1991; Abbring et al., 1998). While human capital and
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signalling theories predict wage losses due to unemployment, search and matching theories argue that an
active job search, when unemployed, might lead to an improvement of post-unemployment wages (Kahn
and Low, 1982). Though these theories have been formulated for wages, they are also helpful in explain-
ing the occupational shifts at the beginning of the employment career in the UK.
Against the background of institutional settings in the UK, I argue that unemployment might have a
different impact on different educational groups. Because vocational training is unstandardized, many
job beginners start their first jobs in inadequate and precarious positions with the prospect of working
their way up to better and more qualified positions (Oppenheimer and Kalmijn, 1995). Therefore, not
only an on-the-job search but also an off-the-job search might be a good strategy by which to improve
initial occupational positions. At the same time low unemployment benefits and a strong sanction regime
in the UK expose unemployed workers to economic pressure to accept the arriving job offer regardless of
its quality (Gangl, 2002b, 2006). Given these institutional settings I believe that search and matching
theories on the one hand and human and capital theory on the other might have different implications
for different educational groups. While search and matching theories might provide reasonable tools for
explaining the outcomes for high-educated people, they are less appropriate for predicting outcomes for
low-educated people. As they are aware of their productivity, high-educated individuals have high
aspirations towards better occupational positions, which, combined with low economic pressure, might
yield positive outcomes when searching off-the-job. In contrast, a strong sanction regime, low unem-
ployment benefits and low household incomes increase the opportunity costs of job search for low-
educated individuals, lowering their chances of improving poor starting occupational positions. Further-
more, because job-specific skills acquired on the job are important components of the human capital of
low-educated workers, loss of a job is more punitive for them than it is for more highly educated people
with more transferable skills. High-educated workers might also choose unemployment over a low-paid
job as a means of signalling their productivity, while a prolonged job search for low-educated workers
might be interpreted by employers not as a signal of their high aspirations, but of their low productivity.
Thus human capital and signalling models might be more appropriate for predicting outcomes for low-
educated people.
This article analyses the consequences of unemployment on the re-entry occupational status and
subsequent occupational status growth of different educational groups in the first years of the employ-
ment career in the UK. The study contributes to the growing amount of literature on indirect job mobility
in several aspects. First, many studies (mainly conducted by economists) do not take into account
national institutions that structure labour markets, which might explain the contradictory results reported
for different countries. In this study, therefore, I systematically embed my expectations within the insti-
tutional context of the UK. Secondly, most studies on this topic use a fixed effect estimator or propensity
score matching approach and therefore are unable either to investigate the impact of unemployment on
different educational groups or to tackle the mechanisms behind unemployment phases. However,
I believe that the mechanisms behind unemployment at the beginning of the employment career are dif-
ferent for different educational groups. Thirdly, I focus on the early employment career, since unemploy-
ment at the beginning of the employment career might have a different meaning than in the later phases
of the employment career. Indeed, unemployment episodes might be part of an ongoing matching pro-
cess. Therefore, conclusions drawn from studies covering employment careers of workers of all ages are
not readily transferable to the early stages of employment careers. Therefore, I use British Household
Panel Survey (BHPS) and apply growth curve models with interrupted time series design to parameterize
in one model both the pre-unemployment and the post-unemployment phases.
In the following I discuss in detail theories predicting outcomes of unemployment and, through
embedding them in the institutional context of the UK, formulate hypotheses for different educational
groups. For a broader understanding of unemployment I also briefly discuss the risk of unemployment
and the chances of re-employment for different educational groups. Before presenting the results,
I describe the data and statistical models and, finally, discuss and summarize the findings in the conclud-
ing section.
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Theoretical framework
There is a large amount of sociological literature investigating how institutional settings structure the
transition from education to the employment system. When explaining the speed of transition and
the quality of the first job, two of the main institutional settings are employed: vocational specificity
of the educational system and employment protection legislation (EPL) (Diprete et al., 2001; Gangl,
2004). While the apprenticeship system of the German-speaking countries (the ‘dual system’) creates
a strong linkage between qualification skills and the demand side, this linkage in countries with more
emphasis on general education and on-the-job training (e.g. the UK) is weak (Shavit and Mu¨ller,
1998). In recent years, many scientists have also emphasized the role of EPL on entering the labour mar-
ket (Scherer, 2004; Wolbers, 2007). In a flexible labour market such as in Britain, the weak institutional
linkage between the educational and employment systems does not have the same negative impact on the
time spent between the educational and employment systems as in countries with strict EPL (Kurz et al.,
2008). In contrast to labour markets with strong EPL, employers in labour markets with weak EPL apply
screening strategies on the job to identify promising workers (Brauns et al., 1999). However, the down-
side of this is the negative impact on the quality of the first job (Wolbers, 2007). Since unstandardized
on-the-job training prevails and screening strategies are common, many job beginners start their first
jobs in low occupational positions. The process of occupational mobility differs depending upon whether
this occurs within a particular organization or involves a change of employer. Job mobility within
well-defined career ladders (internal labour markets) as well as job mobility by changing employers
(usually associated by voluntary job termination) implies the improvement of occupational position
(Burdett, 1978; Oppenheimer and Kalmijn, 1995; Scherer, 2001). Though in this article I focus
less on job mobility while in employment (within or between employer mobility), but on the effect of
unemployment on different educational groups, I formulate expectation for between-job mobility.
Until 1970, there was a strong demand for low-educated skilled and semi-skilled workers and enough
jobs for the unskilled. Since then, the UK economy has experienced the most dramatic decline of
traditional industries among all OECD countries. In the period between 1970 and 2003, the share of
manufacturing jobs declined monotonically from 35 percent to 15 percent (Rowthorn and Coutts,
2004). The dramatic decline in demand for unskilled and low-skilled workers reduced demand for
self-binding commitments by employers towards low-educated entrants, and employers are reluctant
to invest in low-educated employees (Breen, 1997). Thus it is unlikely that low-educated workers will
be able to improve their positions by changing employer. It is higher-educated workers in particular
who profit from belated utilization of their credentials despite non-optimal entry (Scherer, 2004).
What happens after job loss? In line with human capital theory, studies for liberal countries report high
wage penalties (about 10–20%) upon job re-entry (Arulampalam, 2001; Gangl, 2006). The losses in earn-
ings are mainly explained by the devaluation of job-specific skills when changing firms. Thus, unemploy-
ment scarring is particularly relevant for wage losses of high-tenure workers with a large stock of firm-
specific human capital. However, at the beginning of the employment career, wage losses due to devalua-
tion of firm-specific human capital should be moderate, since in the UKmany employees start in transitory
jobs in which they cannot accumulate much job-specific human capital. Gregory and Jukes (2001) report
that in the UK high-educated workers in their middle and later careers suffer the most losses compared to
the control group (10–18% for qualification and about 17% for those older than 36). In contrast, the authors
find that the scar effect for workers at the beginning of the employment career is small or even negligible.
In contrast to specific human capital, general human capital is more easily transferable across firms and is
mainly acquired through formal education. Thus, when comparing the high- and low-educated who
become unemployed, we can expect the high-educated to be in a better position, since their broad academic
skills make them less dependent on the accumulation of job-specific skills, at least at the beginning of their
employment careers. Furthermore, high-educated job-seekers only compete with individuals from the
same educational level. In a labour market with an ample supply of labour, the low-educated are crowded
out by the high-educated down to the end of the job queue, with very little chance of getting a job as a
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consequence (Thurow, 1975). Bearing in mind that the decreasing demand for unskilled and low-skilled
labour created an oversupply of low-educated workers, these workers might face long-term unemployment
and are unlikely to improve their occupational positions on leaving their job.
Signalling theory is often applied to explain post-unemployment wage losses. Lacking information on
the productivity of a prospective employee, employers seek signals that convey information on the job
applicant (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). A (prolonged) unemployment phase is seen as providing employers
with a signal of low productivity. However, EPL in the UK is weak and low occupational positions at the
beginning of the employment career are part of an ongoing relocation process; the stigmatization of
unemployed workers should be less pronounced than in labour markets with strict EPL. Studies on the
entrapment hypothesis illustrate that less tightly regulated and segmented markets lead to a lower risk of
being entrapped in lower status positions than in less regulated labour markets (Scherer, 2004). High-
educated individuals looking for jobs are aware of their productivity and tend therefore not to take the
first available job. Those high-productivity workers who had good jobs prior to unemployment are also
more likely to be recalled by their former employers or may choose to remain unemployed rather than to
accept less prestigious and low-wage jobs (Gibbons and Katz, 1991). Rodriguez-Planas (2004) found
that highly productive laid-off workers choose unemployment over a low-paid job as a means of signal-
ling their productivity. Thus, a prolonged unemployment spell for high-educated workers might be inter-
preted by employers as an indicator of an employee’s high aspiration level. Hence, high-educated
workers might be less susceptible to status losses upon re-entering the labour market.
The human capital approach and signalling models have been challenged on the basis of search and
matching theories via unemployment (Kahn and Low, 1982; Jovanovic, 1984). Though there are good
reasons for believing that unemployment is not the best choice for improving occupational position,
according to Kahn and Low (1982) the reasons for high rewards when searching off-the-job is high job
search intensity that provides job searches with higher numbers of job offers than for those searching on-
the-job. These authors also argue that previous attempts to estimate on-the-job and off-the-job search
have suffered due to a selectivity problem. Those who search on-the-job might have unobserved char-
acteristics that raise the search returns compared to the off-the-job search. After they controlled for
unobservables they found that an off-the-job search brings about 10 percent more rewards than searching
on-the-job. There are also a series of studies for liberal countries that support this view (Abbring et al.,
1998; Antel, 1991). However, it has to be borne in mind that these arguments are only applicable in insti-
tutional contexts such as in the UK. The weak linkage between the educational and employment systems
and the emphasis on formal education lead to young people starting in low occupational positions. When
employment relationships are terminated by the employee (or by mutual agreement) because of a poor
match quality, the next job might improve the job match. In such a scenario, off-the-job search might be
used as an active phase to improve occupational position. Weak EPL generates high levels of turnover
and job mobility. It implies a higher number of vacancies on the labour market. At the same time,
because of high turnover on the labour market, unemployment might be less stigmatizing than in a rigid
labour market. Recent studies emphasize that prolonged searching for work is rewarded with a better job
(Boheim and Taylor, 2000; Gangl, 2002a). However, the job search period depends on the aspiration of
job searchers that reflects their productivity and opportunity costs of the job search (McCall, 1970).
Given that higher educated workers with their general skills are more appreciated on the labour market
than low-educated people (Breen, 1997) and that they are aware of their productivity, they will reject job
offers that fall short of their expectations and remain unemployed. At the same time high-educated work-
ers have more chance of coping with opportunity costs: they receive higher unemployment benefits and
profit from savings from previous salaries. Furthermore, they are more likely to experience financial
support from their spouses and/or family. In contrast, low-educated workers have to deal with the high
opportunity costs of the job search because of their low allocation of financial resources. High financial
pressure to finding a job lowers the aspiration to find a better job position.
In the following I summarize theoretical considerations and formulate hypotheses: because of the
transitory character (stop-gap jobs) of early careers in the UK, many entrants start their careers in
254 Acta Sociologica 54(3)
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over-qualified positions. An unemployment phase can be used to search for a better job match. I argue
that the mechanisms lying behind the unemployment state vary for different educational groups: the
high-educated are pulled, while the less-educated are pushed, into the labour market. The sequential
nature of job offers causes job searchers either to accept a job offer immediately or to wait for the next
job offer. High-educated workers are aware of their productivity and have high expectations towards the
occupational position of the next job. Higher previous salaries and savings, higher unemployment
benefits from previous gross salaries and higher household incomes allow the high-educated to cope
with opportunity costs arising from the job search. High-educated workers might also choose unemploy-
ment over a low-paid job as a means of signalling their productivity. Thus, waiting for a better job offer
might be a good strategy by which to improve their occupational positions. In contrast, the low-educated
are positioned at the bottom of the job queue and an ample supply of unskilled and low-skilled labour
reduces their chances of receiving a ‘good’ position. Thus, waiting for a better job offer might not be the
best strategy, as such an offer will probably not be received. Furthermore, the low unemployment ben-
efits from previous salaries, the sanction regime for the right to receive unemployment benefits and low
household incomes do not buffer the opportunity searching costs, forcing the low-educated to reduce
their job aspirations. Fewer job offers and economic pressure push the low-educated unemployed into
the labour market. Furthermore, a prolonged job search is interpreted by employers not as a signal of
their high aspirations, but of their unemployability.
Taking into account these considerations, I derive the following two hypotheses.
H1a: In line with search and matching models I expect that the incidence of unemployment for
high-educated people will improve their occupational status compared to the high-educated who have
not yet experienced a phase of unemployment.
H1b: In contrast, following the human and signalling models I expect that the incidence of unemploy-
ment for low-educated workers should have a negative impact on their occupational status when
compared to the control group (those without a gap in unemployment).
H2a: In accordance with search and matching models, the prolonged job search for high-educated
workers is likely to improve their re-entry status and subsequent career path.
H2b: In contrast to the high-educated, the low-educated workers are pushed into the labour market
and a prolonged job search by low-educated workers is interpreted by employers not as a signal of their
high aspirations, but of their low productivity. Thus, I expect that compared to the low-educated workers
high-educated workers profit from the prolonged job search.
Data and methods
Data
The data used in this study come from the BHPS, which began in September 1991. Fourteen yearly
waves are available, providing information on education, income and payment, and a considerable
amount of information on other individual issues. Additionally, retrospective data supplement the panel
data (Halpin, 2000). The analysis is based on labour market entrants aged 16–28 (when entering the
labour market) who left the educational or the vocational system between 1980 and 2007. I construct
a dataset using information from the panel and retrospective data. For the retrospective data I use occu-
pational information on the spell level and for the panel data on the yearly basis. Though on average I
have more employment episodes per person for the panel data than for the retrospective data, linear
growth curve models can cope well with unbalanced data. I decided to measure mobility with a
Socio-Economic Index of Occupational Status (ISEI) and not by hourly wage for several reasons (ISEI
scale; see Ganzeboom and Treiman, 1996).1 First of all, while wage growth at the beginning of the
employment career is a ‘natural’ phenomenon in the UK (as well as in other countries), the occupational
status measured in the ISEI score reflects the improvement of occupational positions. Second, the retro-
spective data do not include wage information, which leaves us with low case numbers (especially for
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high-educated individuals). Third, not all employment episodes in the BHPS sample contain working
hours, which makes reconstruction of the hourly gross wage a difficult task. The observational window
of early careers is confined to the 10 years after leaving the educational system. The final sample
includes about 3,000 individuals.
Methods
The methods used in this study are survival analysis and linear growth curve models. Survival anal-
ysis for the transition from the first period of employment into unemployment and the transition
from unemployment into re-employment will shed light on the risks of becoming unemployed and
on the chances of re-gaining employment in different educational groups (Blossfeld et al., 2007). I
will parameterize time as accelerated failure time metric (AFT). An attractive feature of AFT mod-
els is that they allow the modelling of non-monotonic hazard functions and from previous research
it can be assumed that the hazard function for unemployment is bell-shaped (Dolton and
O’Neill, 1996a). These models also allow the effect of covariates to vary over time when introdu-
cing covariates as a shape parameter (Cleves et al., 2002). Strictly speaking, there is no propor-
tional hazard interpretation for AFT models since they are not reducible to the form
hðtjxjÞ ¼ exp 0ð Þexp xjx
  ¼ h0 tð Þexp xjx
 
, where h0 tð Þ is a baseline and exp xjx
 
are exponential
linear predictors. However, hazard can be derived as h tjxj
  ¼  d
dt
S tjxj
 
=S tjxj
 
. For reasons of con-
venience, however, the AFT models are interpreted as hazard models, though the reader should remem-
ber that coefficients of AFT models are the same but have reversed signs.
In order to estimate entry status and the status growth of the pre-unemployment phase aswell as re-entry
status and status growth of the post-unemployment phase I use linear growth curve models, which are an
appropriate method for treating Gaussian repeated correlated outcomes (Verbeke and Molenberghs,
2000).2 Including periods of unemployment, I estimate losses/gains for each educational group upon
re-entering the labour market relative to those who have not experienced unemployment. Because of
employment career interruptions, it is highly unrealistic to assume that individual change trajectories are
continuous functions of time. Unemployment interruptions might shift the level as well as the growth of
occupational status. For this reason, I model occupational status growth before and after unemployment
phases separately but in the samemodel. Note that occupational status growth is onlymodelled for the first
unemployment spell. More detailed model specification is introduced in Appendix I. Note that I
also control for employment interruption other than through unemployment: duration of full-time
education and duration of economic inactivity (maternity leave, house-wife and the rest category).
The states are based on categories defined by the International Labour Office (ILO). It is also
important to control for the reasons for leaving a job (made redundant, voluntary, dismissed, tem-
porary contract ended). To compare job mobility via unemployment with the stayers I also intro-
duce employer change as a metric variable. The models deal with unbalanced data that cover on
average seven years of employment.
Besides the covariates described above, the following covariates are included in the analysis:
(1) region (four regions created from twelve official regions: North, South, Middle, Scotland), (2) sex,
(3) education based on formal educational achievements (primary education with and without vocational
qualification, O-Level, A-Level, lower tertiary and higher tertiary education),3 (4) regional youth unem-
ployment rate (younger than 25 years old), (5) full-time vs. part-time (part-time less than 35 hours a
week), (6) employee vs. self-employee, (7) permanent vs. temporary job, (8) branch of industry based
on Singelmann (1978) classification (extractive, transformative, producer services, distributive services,
personal services and social services), (9) dummy variables for labour market entry cohorts (1985–1989,
1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2004). Additionally, for linear growth curve models, I introduced a
covariate for the duration in employment before the re-employment phase and a set of covariates that
gives information about the inactivity spell: duration of full-time education and duration of economic
inactivity.4
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Empirical results
Before returning to the main issue, the risk of becoming unemployed and the chances of re-gaining
employment are analysed for different educational groups. In the second step, I discuss the impact of
unemployment on the subsequent career.
Risk of unemployment and re-entry chances in employment
The risk of unemployment largely depends on educational endowments (Model 1, Table 1). Model 1 is
restricted to the variables of the scale parameter model because the variables in shape parameter do not
improve the data fit. Higher tertiary, lower tertiary and A-Level education reduce the risk of becom-
ing unemployed. Note that in contrast to hazard models coefficients of AFT models have reversed
signs.
Model 2 sheds light on the chances of leaving unemployment for different educational groups. The
log-logistic regression model provides the best fit for the data among parametric models. All gamma
coefficients in the shape parameter are less than 1, which means that the chances of becoming
re-employed first increase and then decrease.5
According to Model 2, higher education guarantees better chances of re-integration into the labour
market. To gain a better understanding of the re-employment process, I plotted the hazard rate and sur-
vival probabilities (Figure 1). The hazard rate for employees with tertiary education reaches a peak
during the third month in unemployment, while the hazard rate for employees with primary education
peaks in the sixth month of unemployment. The predicted hazard rate for the group with the lowest
Table 1. Risk of unemployment and chances of re-employment (log-logistic transition rate model).
BHPS (1980–2007)
Model 1a Risk of unemployment
Model 2b Chances of re-employment
Scale parameter Shape parameter
Education (ref. Primary without vocational qualification)
Primary with vocational qualification 0.76*** –0.53** –0.10
O-level 0.90*** –0.36*** –0.22***
A-level 1.10*** –0.42*** –0.11
Lower tertiary 1.06*** –0.59*** –0.39**
Higher tertiary 1.54*** –0.46*** –0.41***
Reason for leaving previous job (ref. Made redundant)
Voluntary job termination –0.29**
Other reasons 0.10
Dismissed –0.27
Temporary contract finished –0.25*
Women 0.28** 0.08 0.12*
Constant (scale parameter) 0.65*** 2.42***
Constant (shape parameter) 0.11*** –0.23***
Subjects 2928 984
Failure 989 765
Log-likelihood –2556.70 –1343.37
Notes: *p<0.10; **p<0.05;
***
p<0.01.
aFull set of control variables for Model 1: dummy variables for cohorts (1985–1989, 1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2007), duration
of job search (before first job), full-time vs. part-time job, self-employed, permanent vs. temporary contract, branch of industry,
regional youth unemployment rate, dummy variables for regions.
bFull set of control variables for Model 2 as in Model 1. Additional variables in scale parameter: duration in first employment. Addi-
tional variables in shape parameter: variables for cohorts (1985–1989, 1990–1994, 1995–1999, 2000–2007).
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education level coincides with the month when the allowance for unemployment benefits expires.
Indeed, Dolton and O’Neill (1996b) report that invitations for the ‘RESTART’ programme interview
coincide with re-integration in any job (which includes short-term, temporary and part-time jobs), but
the programme fails to re-integrate workers in solid jobs. Referring to previous research, I interpret
my results in terms of there being few chances for low-educated workers of finding a good job during the
first months of unemployment, which means they must wait until unemployment benefits expire. These
results provide the first evidence for the H2b hypothesis that the low-educated are pushed into disadvanta-
geous jobs in the UK. In contrast, the high-educated entrants display higher transition rates upon re-entering
the labour market, which indicates that they find a better job before unemployment benefits expire.
In addition to the scale parameter, I also introduced the shape parameter gamma for educational
groups (but also for cohorts and gender) allowing the effect of covariates to vary over time. Higher edu-
cation and O-Levels have an accelerating effect on re-entry into employment (shape parameter gamma
in Model 2). This means that high-educated entrants not only perform better at the beginning of the job
search (scale parameter); their chances of re-employment also improve over time compared to the lowest
educational group. Low-educated employees who fail to find a job in the first months of unemployment
face the risk of becoming long-term unemployed.
The next set of dummy variables controls for the reasons for leaving the last job. According to
Model 2, when the worker leaves voluntarily or a temporary contract has come to an end,
re-integration into the labour market is quicker than it is when made redundant. Finally, women are less
likely to lose their job than men (Model 1). While at the beginning of job search processes the chances of
finding a job are equal for men and women (scale parameter), with increasing duration in unemployment
women perform less well than men (shape parameter) (Model 2).
Employment career
In the first part of this section, the impact of educational achievements on the pre-unemployment phase
is investigated. This discussion provides a background for understanding the second area of focus, the
post-unemployment phase. Since this article focuses mainly on the scar effect after the unemployment
phase, the results for the pre-unemployment phase are discussed only briefly.
Figure 1. Predicted survivor function and hazard rate for re-employment by education
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Pre-unemployment career. Even though the institutional link between the educational and employ-
ment systems in the UK is weak, better-educated entrants start their first jobs in much better positions
than low-educated persons (Model 1, Table 2). All in all, these results confirm the human capital theory:
the longer students invest in their education, the higher status they will achieve.
As argued above, employers are reluctant to invest in on-the-job training for lower-skilled workers
and instead prefer to invest in well-educated workers. Owing to weak links between the educational and
employment systems, many entrants with tertiary education start their first job in inadequate positions.
Nonetheless, they have good prospects of working their way up either by staying with the same employer
or by changing employers. Keeping in mind that the ISEI refers to occupational status, the results support
our argumentation. Better-educated entrants holding tertiary, A-Levels and O-Levels are able to improve
their occupational status (status growth time 1) (Model 1). Entrants holding only primary degrees (with
or without vocational qualification) display no status rewards after they enter the labour market. I also
introduced a variable (as metric variable) reflecting the change of employer and interacted this variable
with educational achievements. Only the best qualified (tertiary education) improve their positions with
each employer change (results not shown).6 Women start in higher occupational positions (1.5 points)
than men and there are no differences in status growth (model not shown).
The series of dummy covariates for the last job before becoming unemployed confirms our consid-
erations in the method section: individuals in their last job prior to unemployment already perform less
well than those who do not become unemployed (Table 2, Model 1). Note that the reference category of
each educational group corresponds to the respective educational group of the non-unemployment
group. O-Level, A-Level, lower and higher tertiary educational groups perform less well compared to
the respective educational groups who are still in employment.
Post-unemployment career. In previous models, initial status and status growth were the subjects of
investigation, but what happens when employees lose their jobs? In this section, the main focus is on two
issues comparing different educational groups. First, I investigate whether there is a scar effect of an
unemployment incidence. Second, I ask what impact the duration of unemployment has on re-entry status
for different educational groups.
In Model 2 (Table 2), I introduce the set of dummy covariates reflecting occupational status after the
first post-unemployment job for different educational groups. Unemployed individuals with primary edu-
cation without vocational qualifications, O-Level and A-Level display a lower re-entry status than those
who have not yet experienced an unemployment phase.7 Thus, for lower qualified workers I can confirm
the scar effect hypotheses (H1b). In contrast, for high-educatedworkers unemployment seems to serve as a
bridge to finding a higher status job (H1a). Those with higher tertiary education catch up in status with
those without an unemployment spell upon re-entry into employment (the coefficient is small and not sig-
nificant). For those with lower tertiary education, unemployment is not just a bridge but a trampoline
towards a better job: employeeswith lower tertiary education gain 2.78 points compared to thosewho have
not yet had an unemployment episode. It should be borne in mind that initial job mismatches are more
common among high-skilled individuals, who are also faster in recovering the initial mismatches.
Additionally, I introduced slope effects (status growth after unemployment) for educational achieve-
ments after the unemployment phase. None of the educational groups have higher growth rates com-
pared to the control groups (results not shown). For post-unemployment career I also introduced
interaction variables between education and labour market experience prior to unemployment. Employ-
ment experience has only a negative effect on status at re-entry for individuals with primary education
whether with or without vocational qualifications (Model 2). As argued in the theoretical section, the
lack of a broad academic education makes job-specific skills an important component of the human
capital of low-educated workers. Thus, long tenure before unemployment reflects job-specific skills and
therefore the interruption of job tenures penalizes low-educated workers in particular. I also introduced
dummies for the reasons of leaving the last job before becoming unemployed (coefficients not shown).
Voluntary job termination has a positive and significant effect on tertiary education.
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Table 2. Estimation results for pre- and post-unemployment careers (random intercept and random slope model).
BHPS (1980–2007)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Pre-unemployment phase
Constant 30.44*** 30.43*** 30.42***
First Job (ref. Primary without vocational qualification)
Primary with vocational qualification. 2.56** 2.41** 2.76**
O-Level 5.09*** 5.05*** 5.31***
A-Level 9.06*** 8.98*** 9.72***
Lower tertiary 17.73*** 17.52*** 19.88***
Higher tertiary 25.42*** 25.31*** 28.06***
Last job (for those who will become unemployed)
Primary without vocational qualification. 0.33 0.14 0.05
Primary with vocational qualification. 0.65 0.84 0.51
O-Level 1.29*** 1.00*** 1.10*
A-Level 1.46*** 1.07*** 1.19*
Lower tertiary 3.11*** 3.81*** 3.32***
Higher tertiary 2.52*** 2.44*** 2.69***
Status growth 1
Constant for status growth (time 1) 0.00 0.00 0.01
Primary without vocational qualification. (ref.)
Primary with vocational qualification. 0.00 0.01 0.03
O-Level 0.03*** 0.03** 0.04***
A-Level 0.05*** 0.04*** 0.04***
Lower tertiary 0.07** 0.06*** 0.04***
Higher tertiary 0.07*** 0.07*** 0.05***
Post-unemployment phase (for those with unemployment spell)
Status shift after unemployment
First post-unemployment job in Model 2/Duration of unemployment in Model 3
Primary without vocational qualification. 1.66** 0.16
Primary with vocational qualification. 0.02 0.09
O-Level 1.12** 0.12
A-Level 1.52*** 0.26
Lower tertiary 2.78*** 0.25*
Higher tertiary 0.02 0.16
Employment experience (prior to unemployment)
Primary without vocational qualification. 0.04*** 0.04***
Primary with vocational qualification. 0.06* 0.05*
O-Level 0.00 0.00
A-Level 0.00 0.00
Lower tertiary 0.02 0.02
Higher tertiary 0.02 0.01
Status growth after unemployment
Constant for status growth (time2) 0.02** 0.03* 0.00
Number of subjects 2928 2928 2928
Log likelihood 67323.94 67259.20 67215.68
Notes: *p<0.10; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Full set of variables (intercept): dummy variables for cohorts (1985–1989, 1990–1994,
1995–1999, 2000–2007), sex, full-time vs. part-time job, self-employed, panel vs. retrospective data, permanent vs. temporary
contract, branch of industry, regional youth unemployment rate, dummy variables for regions, reasons for leaving pre-unemploy-
ment job, employment interruptions (duration in full-time education and duration in economic inactivity). Full set of variables
(slope 1): dummies for cohorts, sex, full-time vs. part-time, self-employed, permanent vs. temporary, dummy variables for cohorts,
employment interruptions (duration in full-time education and duration in economic inactivity).
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As argued in the Introduction, for highly-educated persons a prolonged job search might be a better
strategy than it would be for low-qualified individuals. To test this hypothesis (H2b) I introduced unem-
ployment duration in Model 3 (instead of incidence of unemployment as in Model 2). The results support
my line of argumentation: with every month spent searching for a job, employees improve their occu-
pational status by 0.25/0.16 points. In contrast, low-educated workers lose in status with each month of
unemployment (though not significantly).
Summary and discussion
In this study I have investigated the early careers of workers in the UK, focusing on the effect of
unemployment on the subsequent employment careers of different educational groups. Embedding
my expectations within the institutional context of the UK I argued that the mechanisms behind indirect
job mobility differ between groups with different educational achievements.
In an institutional regime of an uncoordinated market economy, and with weak linkage between the
educational and the employment systems, poor job allocations are a widespread phenomenon. Many
poorly allocated workers might improve their position via an episode of unemployment. However, unem-
ployment has a different impact on the post-unemployment career of different educational groups. The
sequential nature of job offers for the high-educated allows them towait for attractive job offers. As I have
argued, due to their higher previous salaries and savings, high-educated entrants are also under less eco-
nomic pressure to accept the first available job than are low-educated workers. Furthermore, high-
educated workers do not compete with low-educated workers and thus do not take the first available job
they are offered. In contrast, fewer job offers, competition with the better educated, low replacement rates
for previous gross salaries, the sanction regime for the right to unemployment benefits and low household
incomes push low-educated workers into taking the first available job offer. Results confirm our expec-
tations: individuals holding tertiary degrees catch up in status with the control group upon re-entering the
labourmarket. No other educational group improves its occupational status compared to the control group.
A prolonged phase of job searching for people with tertiary degrees has a positive effect on their re-entry
positions, whereas a long job-searching phase penalizes low-educated people. Furthermore, employment
experience prior to unemployment only has a negative effect on the subsequent status of low-educated
individuals, which indicates the importance of specific human capital for low-educated workers.
Summarizing the results it becomes evident that labour market theories in the UK institutional context
mean different things to different educational groups. While search and matching theories are appropri-
ate for explaining the future outcomes for indirect job mobility of high-educated people, they fail to pre-
dict outcomes of low-educated workers. Devaluation of specific human capital and the stigma attached
to unemployment provide a better framework for explaining status losses for low-educated people after
the unemployment phase.
Appendix I
I use an interrupted time series (ITS) design with a non-equivalent control group. ITS design allows
for a model starting occupational positions and growth of occupational status before the unemployment
phase and the re-starting occupational status and occupational growth after the unemployment phase (for
introduction, see Singer and Willet, 2003). Furthermore, by using an additional control group (non-
equivalent control group) I can estimate the differences between the control and the treatment group
(unemployed) before and after the unemployment phase.8 The main advantage of ITS design for my
study is that it can be used with growth curve models. Using ITS design, I only model discontinuity inter-
ruption of the first unemployment spell. In principle, I can go on to model the third and fourth post-
unemployment phases. I run out of cases, however, especially for those with higher education because
only a few of them become unemployed in our research window.
Schmelzer: Unemployment: A Trap or Stepping Stone? 261
261
 at Inst Fuer Arbeitsmarkt-Und on September 10, 2013asj.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
For the intercept (entry/re-entry status) and slope (status growth) models in the pre- and post-
unemployment phases with ith subject at the jth measurement occasion and depending on xth covariate,
I use the following model specification:
Yij ¼ 00 þ 01xij1 þ 02xij2 þ . . . þ 0pxijp þ b0i
 
þ 10 þ 11xij1 þ 12xij2 þ . . . þ 1pxijp þ b1i
  time1 
þ 20 þ 21xij1 þ 22xij2 þ . . . þ 2pxijp þ b2i
  T 
þ 30 þ 31xij1 þ 32xij2 þ . . . þ 3pxijp þ b3i
  time2  T þ "ij
ð1Þ
Figure 2 helps to clarify the model specification by demonstrating an imaginary person with 24
months of unemployment. The baseline parameter 00 and parameters 0p associated with covariates
xijp stand for the occupational status in the first job. Parameter 10 and parameters with the corresponding
variables 1pxijp are the status growth for the pre-unemployment phase. Because unemployment might
shift the re-entry status and post-unemployment slope, the phase of unemployment needs to be modelled
separately. Covariate T stands for the treatment effect (unemployment) and might be a dummy (incidence
of unemployment) or a continuous variable (duration of unemployment). Parameter 20 and parameters
with the corresponding variables 2pxijp reflect the jump or drop in status after re-entry into the labour
market. To capture discontinuity in the post-unemployment slope, I introduced an additional parameter
30  time2 depending on the parameters with covariates 3pxijp. Since I hypothesize that the post-
unemployment phase has a strong impact on the later employment career, covariate time2 clocks the
starting point at 0 with a separate parameter 30. Hierarchical model specification (1) has two random
effects b0i and b1ið Þ for the pre-unemployment phase and two b2i and b3ið Þ for the post-unemployment
Figure 2. Occupational status and occupational status growth before and after unemployment
spell
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phase. Random intercepts and random slope effects are assumed to be normally distributed with the
mean 0 and variances s20, s
2
1, s
2
2 and s
2
3. Since I have unbalanced data, I use a 4 x 4 unstructured
covariance matrix. Measurement error "ij is assumed to be independent of random effects bið Þ and nor-
mally distributed. In my models I also control for other states of inactivity (further education and other
states) but do not report results. For individuals who did not experience an unemployment spell (T¼0) in
the research window the model specification (1) boils down to two parameters 0p and 1p.
Yij ¼ 00 þ 01xij1 þ 02xij2 þ . . . þ 0pxijp þ b0i
 
10 þ 11xij1 þ 12xij2 þ . . . þ 1pxijp þ b1i
  time1 þ "ij
ð2Þ
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Notes
1. Status scores are assigned to occupational titles (on the basis of information from the ISCO-88
classification) in accordance with a scale ranging from 16 for occupations with the lowest status
to 90 for occupations with the highest status.
2. Based on the maximum likelihood method, growth curve models yield valid estimates in the instance
of unbalanced and missing data under the missing random (MAR) assumption (Fitzmaurice et al.,
2004).
3. Because of low numbers of cases for some educational groups, I constructed educational groups using
formal educational achievements. I decided to collapse educational groups according to the formal
educational achievements because in the UK the employers’ preferences for formal educational
achievements prevail over vocational achievements. However, since the differences are more pro-
nounced between primary education with and without vocational training and in terms of ISEI score
in the first job (own calculation), I treat primary education with and without vocational training
separately (Brauns et al., 1999). My end sample consists of 502 cases with primary education and
without vocational training, 127 cases with primary education and vocational training, 871 cases with
O-Level (with and without vocational training), 890 cases with A-Level (with and without vocational
training), 320 cases with lower tertiary education and 219 cases with high tertiary education.
4. The mean and standard deviations for covariates in the sample are available upon request.
5. To avoid misspecification of the model, I also fitted a piecewise constant exponential model (not
shown), which provides downwards biased coefficients: the Bayesian information criterion (BIC) for
the log-logistic model is 94 times lower than for the piecewise constant exponential model, which
provides the best fit for the data.
6. Note that the coefficients in questions do not change after the introduction of direct job mobility
covariates.
7. Note how the post-unemployment coefficients are interpreted compared to the stayers; they
should be interpreted irrespective of the pre-unemployment coefficients (last job for those who
will become unemployed). To calculate the absolute gains/losses for each educational group, the
last job coefficient should be subtracted from the post-unemployment coefficients. For example,
for lower tertiary education the status gains amount to 2.78 – (–3.81) ¼ 6.59 points on the ISEI
scale.
8. Note that I could also calculate the average treatment effect. However, the aim of this study was to
estimate the relative occupational standing of unemployed people before and after the unemployment
phase relative to a control group and not to estimate the average treatment effect.
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